
More than a managed service — a strategic technology partnership. This workshop marks a new chapter: rebuilding full visibility of Jellinbah's IT & OT environment and delivering the infrastructure, security, and operational resilience a multi-billion-dollar mining operation demands.
Seven sessions for the Smile IT and Jellinbah leadership workshop — Thursday 21 May 2026.
The Vernetzen Network Review (Luke King, Principal Consultant) identified six critical findings across Bluff and Plains operations. While the network successfully supports current operations, significant gaps threaten future growth and operational continuity.

Fixed towers provide stable backhaul for mobile trailers, with permanent fibre connections and backup power. Four towers are recommended across Bluff and Plains operations. Ramp 7 has been completed since the Vernetzen assessment, and Mac North is currently underway.
| Location | Height | Type | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ramp 7 | 60m | Guyed | Completed |
| Mac North | 40m | Guyed / Self-supporting | Underway |
| Plains South | 30m | Guyed / Transportable | Planned |
| Central South | 40m | Guyed / Self-supporting | Planned |

On-site Smile IT engineers are witnessing network degradation firsthand. The following is a direct account from a Smile IT field engineer following a site visit in April 2026, corroborated by supervisor feedback across four departments.
Jellinbah now operates at multi-billion-dollar scale. The current network infrastructure was not designed for this level of concurrent users, applications, and safety-critical workflows. On rain days — when outdoor work stops and all staff move indoors — the network slows to a crawl or stops entirely.
Regular failures on rain days. Conference rooms non-functional. Safety inductions blowing out by up to 50%.
File access, MEX, and iVolve performance heavily degraded. Operations staff unable to complete workflows during peak load.
File server access delays. Maptek running extremely slow — directly impacting mine planning and survey workflows.
iVolve and MEX often slow or inoperable during peak load. Maintenance scheduling and work order management impacted.
Based on field observations and input from Smile IT's senior engineers, the most productive initial investigation should focus on latency profiling and bottleneck identification across the site WAN and core switching infrastructure. The symptoms — rain-day degradation, application-specific slowdowns, and peak-load failures — are consistent with bandwidth saturation, QoS misconfiguration, or upstream ISP contention.
Today, Jellinbah's entire technology stack — servers, domain controllers, storage, and core switching — sits in a single data centre at one site. A single point of failure at that location takes down both Bluff and Plains operations simultaneously.
All production servers, domain controllers, and core network infrastructure currently reside in a single data centre at one site. There is no secondary cluster, no geographic failover, and no automatic recovery path. An extended power outage, hardware failure, or physical incident at that location would render both mine sites operationally blind — no SCADA, no domain authentication, no business applications.
Redundant internet connections are confirmed in place across all Jellinbah sites — diverse carrier paths providing failover capability.
Ongoing monitoring and periodic failover testing is required to ensure redundancy remains active and functional as the network evolves.
Maintain dual-ISP configuration. Schedule periodic failover testing (at minimum annually) to validate that automatic switchover operates as expected. Document carrier contacts and escalation paths.
Multiple fibre runs exist across site, but path diversity is limited in key areas — at MacNorth, both redundant paths run along the same road, meaning a single excavation or equipment strike could sever both. Non-fibre backup paths (microwave/wireless) exist in some areas but their operational status is not fully confirmed.
Untested or unverified redundancy is not redundancy. A single incident on a shared corridor could sever inter-site connectivity with no confirmed fallback.
Confirm with site comms technicians whether backup path testing has already been completed. Where testing has not been done, schedule formal failover tests under realistic conditions. Map all fibre routes, identify shared-path vulnerabilities, and prioritise diverse physical routing between critical buildings.
The current in-pit mesh (Ivolve) is built on 2.4GHz Wi-Fi using OLSR (Open Link State Routing) — a protocol designed for fixed neighbourhood meshes circa 2010. With 400+ mobile devices, every device movement triggers a broadcast, consuming airtime for routing overhead rather than application traffic. The mesh is technically self-healing but is not fit for purpose at this scale.
Bandwidth is consumed by routing protocol overhead, not application data. As the pit grows and device count increases, performance degrades further. Real-time SCADA and collision-avoidance systems cannot rely on this architecture.
Commission a desktop study and RF coverage design to identify all gaps and model alternatives. Options include next-generation Kinetic Mesh (technology-agnostic), Private LTE/5G, or a hybrid architecture. A decision cannot be made without a full site survey and findings report.
All servers in a single data centre at one site. Domain controllers, file servers, SCADA historians, and business applications all co-located.
Single site failure = complete loss of authentication, file services, SCADA data, and all business applications across both mine sites.
Implement the original stretched cluster design: split the server cluster across two physically separate locations at site (e.g., main admin building + mine operations centre). Windows Server Failover Clustering (WSFC) or VMware vSAN Stretched Cluster provides automatic failover with near-zero RTO.
The in-pit OT wireless network is not performing. This issue has surfaced repeatedly across tickets, operational feedback, and the independent network review. Before any technology is selected, Smile IT recommends a structured desktop study and coverage design to understand the full scope of the problem — and to ensure the right solution is chosen for Jellinbah’s specific environment.
Recurring themes from Zared's ticket and email traffic paint a clear operational picture: repeated network drop-outs are affecting VIMS downloads, KPAR telemetry, and iVolve/Titan systems. He is a strong advocate for Rajant Kinetic Mesh as the path forward for in-pit connectivity, and is frustrated that the strategic decision continues to slip. There is also ongoing tension over what is covered under the MSA versus project work, and multi-vendor coordination delays are creating single points of failure in the field.
Haul trucks, SCADA sensors, and autonomous systems depend on continuous, low-latency wireless. Current infrastructure cannot reliably cover a dynamic, deepening open-cut pit.
Wireless coverage gaps have been raised across multiple reviews and operational discussions. Every deferral compounds the risk — and the cost of reactive fixes when systems fail mid-operation.
The Komatsu autonomous haulage workstream requires a wireless backbone capable of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. The current infrastructure cannot reliably support this.
Before selecting a technology, we need to understand the full picture
Smile IT will engage specialist wireless design partners to conduct a full desktop study of the Bluff and Plains operations. This will produce a detailed coverage design showing all current gaps, terrain challenges, and the infrastructure requirements for each candidate technology — giving Jellinbah an evidence-based foundation for the investment decision.
Identify all areas of the pit where current wireless infrastructure fails to meet OT requirements — mapped against haul routes, SCADA sensor locations, and autonomous vehicle paths.
Desktop RF propagation modelling across the dynamic pit geometry, accounting for depth progression, bench heights, and equipment obstructions.
A formal report presenting the coverage gaps, technology options, indicative node counts, and a cost/performance comparison — ready for board-level investment decision.
Smile IT is technology-agnostic — the desktop study will determine which option, or combination, best fits Jellinbah’s environment and budget
Smile IT does not have a preferred vendor outcome for this decision. We have access to specialist partners across all three technology categories and will engage the right expertise to conduct the desktop study. The findings report will present a clear, evidence-based recommendation — including indicative costs, node counts, and a phased deployment plan — so Jellinbah can make an informed investment decision with confidence.
Confirm at this workshop that a formal desktop study and coverage design will be commissioned. Agree scope, timeline, and budget envelope.
Smile IT engages specialist wireless design partners to conduct RF propagation modelling, coverage gap mapping, and technology option analysis across Bluff and Plains.
Delivery of a formal report presenting all coverage gaps, technology options (A, B, or C), indicative costs, and a recommended architecture with supporting evidence.
Jellinbah reviews the findings and selects a technology direction. Smile IT scopes and delivers a pilot deployment to validate the design before full rollout.
Kate Green has previously flagged the need for a SCADA security review. The absence of formal IT/OT network segmentation at Jellinbah is not just a best-practice gap — it is a material risk to operational continuity and safety. Here is the evidence base.
OT systems control physical processes. Unlike IT, a cyber incident in an OT environment can directly threaten human life, plant equipment, and environmental safety. Paying a ransom is not an option when SCADA integrity cannot be verified.
Jellinbah operates heavy mobile equipment, conveyors, and electrical systems controlled by OT/SCADA. A compromised SCADA system is a safety incident, not just an IT incident.
Organisations must identify vital systems, understand OT process dependencies, and create architecture that defends those systems from other internal and external networks.
Jellinbah likely maintains OT schematics and communications diagrams under their EEM for SCADA/PLC systems. However, a formal IT/OT architecture document and documented system dependencies have not been independently reviewed or audited. Recommendation: commission a third-party audit of existing IT documentation to validate completeness and currency.
OT data — including SCADA historian data, equipment telemetry, and process control configurations — must be protected from unauthorised access and exfiltration. While operational production data (tonnes, haul cycles) is not highly sensitive in isolation, control system configurations and historian data represent high-value targets for sabotage or competitive intelligence.
KPAR telemetry, VIMS data, and iVolve/Titan operational data are OT data assets. A formal data classification framework for OT systems is not in place. Priority focus should be on protecting control system configurations and historian access — not operational metrics.
OT must be segmented and segregated from all other networks. This is the most operationally critical principle. The Purdue Model and IEC 62443 require a defined DMZ between corporate IT and OT control networks — not just VLAN separation, but firewall-enforced zone boundaries with explicit allow-lists.
Jellinbah's IT and OT networks are not physically separated — VLANs through a single FortiGate firewall are the only logical boundary. There is partial physical separation in that an edge router sits between the FortiGate and the iVolve network, however an edge router is not an appropriate control for OT/IT segmentation. Recommendation: replace the edge router with a dedicated next-generation firewall (e.g. FortiGate) positioned in the OT DMZ, enforcing strict zone boundaries with explicit allow-lists between corporate IT and OT control networks. This is the priority gap to address to meet IEC 62443 and ACSC OT Principles.
Vendors and third-party integrators with access to OT systems represent a significant attack surface. Each vendor connection is a potential entry point.
Komatsu, Auto Elects, and Smile IT all have access to OT-adjacent systems. Vendor access controls, remote access policies, and connection monitoring are all required.
No amount of technology investment mitigates OT cyber risk without trained personnel who can identify, respond to, and recover from incidents. OT-specific skills are distinct from IT security skills.
Smile IT's proposed cybersecurity uplift (3 dedicated seats + credentials) directly addresses this principle. OT-specific training for site operations staff is also required.
Source: ASD's ACSC, "Principles of Operational Technology Cyber Security", October 2024. Co-sealed by CISA, NSA, FBI, NCSC-UK, Cyber Centre Canada, NCSC-NZ, BSI Germany, NCSC-NL, NISC Japan, NIS Korea.
Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) / IEC 62443 Zones & Conduits model. Source: Palo Alto Networks, Dragos, NIST SP 800-82 Rev.3.
Without formal IT/OT segmentation, Jellinbah's SCADA systems, KPAR telemetry, and iVolve/Titan operational data share network adjacency with corporate IT systems. A ransomware infection, compromised credential, or malicious insider on the IT network has a direct path to OT systems — including SCADA.
Define Security Zones: Group all OT assets (SCADA, PLCs, historians) into a dedicated OT zone. Corporate IT remains in a separate IT zone.
Implement a DMZ: Deploy a firewall-enforced DMZ between IT and OT. All data exchange (e.g., SCADA historian to business reporting) must pass through the DMZ — never directly.
Define Conduits: All communication paths between zones must be explicitly defined, documented, and monitored. Uncontrolled lateral movement is eliminated.
Apply Security Levels: IEC 62443 defines Security Levels (SL1–SL4). For a coal mining operation with SCADA, SL2 is the minimum target — protection against intentional violation using simple means.
Continuous Monitoring: Deploy OT-specific network monitoring (passive, non-intrusive) to detect anomalies without disrupting time-critical control messages.
Source: IEC 62443-3-3, ISA/IEC 62443 Series. Endorsed by NIST SP 800-82 Rev.3 and ASD's ACSC OT Principles.
A formal OT security review is required to establish a defensible baseline. The following scope has been recommended based on the current environment assessment.
Identify and document all OT assets (SCADA, PLCs, historians, HMIs) across Bluff and Plains
Map all current IT/OT network connections and data flows
Assess current segmentation state against IEC 62443 and ACSC OT Principles
Design and implement a DMZ between IT and OT environments
Establish vendor remote access controls for Komatsu, Auto Elects, and other OT integrators
Deploy passive OT network monitoring (non-intrusive, safe for SCADA environments)
Develop an OT-specific incident response playbook
The Australian Cyber Security Centre's Essential Eight is the baseline mitigation framework for all Australian organisations. Aligning to E8 is not just best practice — it is increasingly a requirement for cyber insurance, government contracts, and supply chain compliance. For an operation of Jellinbah's scale and criticality, achieving a documented E8 maturity baseline is a foundational step.
Smile IT has made a significant investment in dedicated cybersecurity capability — expanding the team with 3 new cyber specialists and appointing Cameron to oversee security operations for both Smile IT and all clients. This is not a bolt-on service; it is a core capability we are building to protect the organisations we support.
A clear picture of the technology environment Jellinbah needs to operate safely, efficiently, and at scale — across infrastructure, OT, security, and people.
A stretched server cluster across two physically separate on-site locations eliminates the single point of failure. Dual-ISP internet with tested failover. Fibre routes with diverse physical paths between critical buildings. No single incident — excavation, equipment strike, or hardware failure — takes the business offline.
A dedicated OT DMZ firewall enforcing strict zone boundaries between corporate IT and SCADA/control networks. All remote access through authenticated, audited pathways. ACSC Essential Eight maturity at ML2 across all critical systems. SCADA historian and process control data protected from exfiltration.
An in-pit wireless network designed for the mine environment — not adapted from fixed-site technology. Whether Kinetic Mesh, Private LTE/5G, or a hybrid architecture, the solution is selected on evidence from a formal desktop study and RF survey. 400+ mobile devices connected reliably. SCADA and collision-avoidance systems operating without bandwidth contention.
Ticket volume driven by planned maintenance, not recurring failures. Scheduled patching, firmware reviews, disk hygiene automation, and monthly health reporting. A formal proactive maintenance framework under the MSA breaks the reactive cycle. Site operations staff spend time on mine operations — not IT troubleshooting.
Complete documentation of all IT and OT systems — architecture diagrams, VLAN designs, firewall configurations, fibre topology, SCADA integrations. A single source of truth that survives staff changes. Smile IT re-onboarded with full operational visibility across both Bluff and Plains sites.
Technology infrastructure that scales with the mine's expansion — not one that constrains it. Automation-ready OT networks. Cloud-integrated business systems. A formal MSA that reflects the true scope of delivery and provides a commercial framework for new workstreams as Jellinbah grows.
Note: This section is a starting point for discussion. The future state vision should be validated and expanded with Jellinbah's leadership during the workshop — particularly around automation priorities, growth timelines, and technology investment appetite.
Jellinbah currently operates a mixed, non-standardised technology estate across Bluff, Plains, and Head Office. Inconsistent hardware and software platforms create hidden costs, security gaps, and support inefficiencies that compound over time.
Single Windows deployment image — any device, any site, consistent in 30 minutes
Single hardware vendor relationship — volume pricing, priority support, next-business-day parts
Unified security policy across all firewalls, WAPs, and switches — no configuration drift
Centralised monitoring and management — Smile IT sees every device across every site from a single pane of glass
A structured programme of work to address the six critical findings, modernise the IT/OT environment, and position Jellinbah for operational automation and future growth.
KPAR/Nexis data transfer issues are ongoing (PO #294968 raised). Wi-Fi capability gaps are being chased with site. Cam met Zared and Auto Elects (Chris) on site to align. VIMS downloads (ticket 778547) remain a recurring friction point. Multi-vendor sequencing between Komatsu, Auto Elects, and Smile IT is slowing field outcomes — a single point of accountability for in-pit communications is needed.

Prioritised actions across short-term (0–6 months), medium-term (6–18 months), and long-term (18+ months) horizons — drawn from the current state assessment findings.
Split the server cluster across two physically separate on-site locations (main admin building + mine operations centre). Windows Server Failover Clustering (WSFC) or VMware vSAN Stretched Cluster provides automatic failover with near-zero RTO. Eliminates the current single point of failure for all production workloads.
Deploy a next-generation firewall (e.g. FortiGate) in the OT DMZ, replacing the edge router currently providing limited traffic control between the corporate network and iVolve. Enforce strict zone boundaries with explicit allow-lists to meet IEC 62443 and ACSC OT Principles.
Maintain the dual-ISP configuration across all Jellinbah sites. Schedule periodic failover testing (minimum annually) to validate automatic switchover. Document carrier contacts and escalation paths.
Confirm with site comms technicians whether backup path testing has been completed. Where not done, schedule formal failover tests. Map all fibre routes, identify shared-path vulnerabilities, and prioritise diverse physical routing between critical buildings.
Engage specialist partners to conduct a full site coverage analysis — RF propagation modelling, gap mapping, and a findings report presenting technology options (Kinetic Mesh, Private LTE/5G, or hybrid). A decision cannot be made without evidence. This is the prerequisite to any wireless investment.
Commission a formal SCADA security review covering remote access controls, patch management, authentication, network segmentation, and incident response. Produce a prioritised remediation plan. Validate that IT/OT physical separation is correctly configured at each site.
Define approved hardware and software standards across all Jellinbah sites. Eliminate vendor fragmentation. Implement a firmware and patch management cadence. Standardise endpoint builds to reduce the recurring ticket volume driven by configuration drift.
Engage a third party to audit existing IT documentation — architecture diagrams, VLAN designs, system dependencies, SCADA integrations — to validate completeness and currency. Establish a live asset and document library as the single source of truth.
Following the desktop study findings, deploy the recommended wireless architecture across Bluff and Plains. Decommission the legacy iVolve OLSR mesh. Deliver a network purpose-built for mobile mining equipment, SCADA, and collision-avoidance systems.
Progress Essential Eight maturity to ML2 across all critical systems — prioritising application control, patch management, and multi-factor authentication. Implement OT-specific security training for site operations staff.
No amount of technology investment mitigates OT cyber risk without trained personnel. Deliver OT-specific security training to site operations staff who interact with SCADA, iVolve, and control systems. OT security skills are distinct from IT security skills.
Position the technology environment to support operational automation initiatives — from SCADA historian analytics to autonomous equipment integration. Infrastructure decisions made today should be evaluated against this long-term automation roadmap.
Smile IT designed, built, and commissioned this entire network. The infrastructure is Smile IT’s work — the documentation, the VLAN design, the FortiGate configuration, the fibre topology. When the previous IT Manager removed this from the MSA, ongoing support became fragmented and accountability unclear. The new agreement must formally include the Bluff Village network under Smile IT’s managed services scope. This is not a new engagement — it is restoring what was always ours to support.
SmileTel is Smile IT's carrier-grade telecommunications division, providing wholesale voice and data services directly to clients. By consolidating connectivity and voice under a single managed provider, Jellinbah gains faster support, better pricing, and deep integration with the broader IT environment.
Consolidating voice and data under SmileTel eliminates the gap between your connectivity provider and your managed IT partner. A single point of accountability means faster fault resolution, proactive outage notification, and commercial leverage across all circuits — with full visibility in the same platform that monitors your servers, endpoints, and OT network.
Primary relationship owner for the Jellinbah account. Responsible for strategic alignment, commercial oversight, and executive-level engagement with Jellinbah leadership.
Owns service quality, SLA performance, and escalation management. The operational bridge between Jellinbah's day-to-day needs and the Smile IT delivery team.
The core BAU delivery team assigned exclusively to the Jellinbah account. Handles day-to-day service desk, field support, and systems administration.
Specialist project delivery capability for infrastructure upgrades, network deployments, and technology transformations. Engaged on a project basis, separate from BAU scope.
A dedicated security practice with a focus on Essential Eight compliance, threat detection, and incident response. Directly supports Jellinbah's security uplift roadmap.
Dedicated field presence at Bluff and Plains operations
24/7 monitoring, after-hours support, and proactive maintenance
Project engineers engaged outside BAU — no MSA scope drift
Dedicated cyber practice with E8 compliance focus
“You can get a helpdesk from any provider. What Jellinbah needs — and what Smile IT is built to deliver — is a partner that listens, understands your operation, advises with expertise, and stands beside you through every challenge. That is the relationship we are here to rebuild.”
We start by understanding your operation — the mine, the village, the OT environment, the people. No assumptions, no templates. Every recommendation is grounded in what we observe at Jellinbah.
Our recommendations are evidence-based and vendor-neutral where possible. We will tell you what you need to hear, not what is easiest to sell. The Vernetzen review is an example of that commitment.
We measure success by your outcomes — uptime, security posture, operational continuity — not by SLA metrics. If Jellinbah's operations are running well, we are doing our job.
No blind spots. We will give you complete visibility across IT and OT — device inventory, billing, security posture, and service delivery. You will always know what you are paying for and what you are getting.
The Master Services Agreement requires renewal to reflect the significant expansion in scope and delivery since 2022. The gap analysis reveals material differences between what is contracted and what is currently being delivered.
Note — Azure, Microsoft licensing, and Acronis sit outside this MSA. The figures above reflect the managed services agreement only and exclude Acronis backup licensing ($20,135/mo), Azure infrastructure consumption, and Microsoft 365 / licensing costs, all of which are billed separately. Total technology spend across all Smile IT-managed services and licensing is higher than the figures shown.
Conduct a full asset review to ensure the renewed MSA accurately reflects the current technology estate across Bluff and Plains. This forms the baseline for scope definition.
The gap analysis identifies several services currently being delivered that are not formally captured in the MSA. This creates 'BAU drift' risk — scope creep without commercial recognition.
Reconcile the May 2025 draft MSA against current invoicing and actual service delivery. Ensure the renewed agreement reflects what is genuinely being provided today.
Zared Crosby has flagged ongoing tension over what is covered under the MSA versus project work. Clear delineation is needed to manage expectations and protect both parties.